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Health Care Consumer Choice
The Role of Information
Catherine G. McLaughlin
University of Michigan
Choice is a highly prized commodity in the United States.  The
freedom to choose is fiercely protected.  Recently health care consum-
ers have felt as though their freedom to choose has been threatened:
when they seek care, from whom, and how often; the site of treatment,
whether inpatient or outpatient; whether they can spend a third day in
the hospital after a normal delivery; whether they can purchase generic
rather than brand-name drugs.  Rightly or wrongly, they blame a lot of
this loss of freedom on the growth of managed care.  We are witnessing
a plethora of articles and stories in the mainstream press, on television,
even in movies like As Good As It Gets, as well as testimony at federal
and state legislative committee hearings debating Patient Bill of Rights
legislation.1
What most people may not realize is that before a consumer, a
patient, ever reaches an individual health care provider’s office to dis-
cuss a particular diagnosis and treatment, a myriad of decisions have
been made—decisions that influence the selection of the provider, the
treatment, and how much the treatment will cost the patient.  The typi-
cal health care consumer faces a road map of options, and the conse-
quences of taking one option instead of the other are always attached to
those choices.  In many cases, when consumers make one choice, they
are getting on a one-way road with that choice leading to future con-
straints.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for some adults the first choice that may
in part be conditioned on an individual’s desire for health insurance
coverage is whether to enter the labor market.  The role played by
Medicaid in the welfare-to-work decision is frequently discussed.  Less
attention is paid to the effect of health insurance coverage on other
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populations, but the desire for affordable health insurance may also
influence the labor market decisions of those not eligible for Medicaid,
such as spouses of working adults without employment-based insur-
ance.
Adults who do not seek employment or who are unsuccessful in
finding a job end up either covered by Medicaid, obtaining insurance
through another source (e.g., a spouse’s plan or a plan obtained in the
nongroup market), or uninsured. 
VARIATION IN FIRM OFFER RATES
The decision of what kind of firm in which to seek employment is
also influenced by the demand for health insurance.  Health insurance
options vary by firm.  While health insurance is but one factor in firm
choice, it’s not difficult to believe that young, single males may delib-
erately choose to supply their labor to a small, high-tech firm that
offers no health insurance in exchange for higher wages.  It is also
Figure 1 Labor Market and Health Insurance Choices
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understandable that a young male who has similar skills but who has a
wife and two small children may choose instead to supply his labor to a
large corporation, earning a lower salary but receiving a rich family
health insurance package at a large group rate. 
Approximately 25 percent of working adults are employed by
firms that do not offer health insurance (McLaughlin 1999a).  Small
firms, those with 25 or fewer employees, are disproportionately repre-
sented in this group.  While 90 percent of firms with 100 or more
employees offer some kind of group health insurance package to their
workers, less than half of those with fewer than 10 employees do so.
These differences in offer rates have been fairly constant over time and
stem from a variety of labor and insurance market differences (Brown,
Hamilton, and Medoff 1990; McLaughlin and Zellers 1992).  
Affordability
A survey of approximately 2,000 small businesses in seven cities
revealed that the reasons for not offering a group health insurance pol-
icy to their employees could be grouped into three different categories
summarized as affordability, employee attitudes, and availability
(McLaughlin and Zellers 1994).  The number-one reason given in this
and other surveys is dollars; virtually all small business owners say that
high and rising health insurance premiums are the primary reason for
not offering health insurance.  The lack of affordable health insurance
products is a central problem for small businesses and their employees.
Many small businesses operate on low profit margins and face premi-
ums 10–40 percent higher than those paid by large firms (GAO 1992).
The convergence of low profit margins, low wages, and high premiums
means than neither employers nor employees in small businesses can
easily trade revenue or wages for health insurance. 
Attitudes
The failure of many small businesses to purchase health insurance
has as much to do with attitudes and perceptions as with affordability.
The majority of owners who did not offer insurance (61 percent) said
that they had no interest in offering any (McLaughlin and Zellers
1994).  To some degree, this attitude reflects the nature of the business.
112 McLaughlin
For example, one shrimper in Tampa said, “I go to the dock every
morning and say ‘You, you, and you, jump on board.’  What am I sup-
posed to do?  Get them to sign a Blue Cross and Blue Shield contract
for the day?”2  In addition, many small businesses have very loosely
defined or temporal employment contracts with their workers (e.g., taxi
cab drivers, construction workers).  
The driving force behind this lack of interest, however, was the
belief that their workers did not want coverage, that they preferred
higher wages to health insurance.  In contrast to what many workers
apparently believe, the employer does not pay for health insurance.
Regardless of who writes the premium check, the workers and consum-
ers pay for insurance through lower wage growth and higher prices
(Pauly 1997); the owners surveyed felt as though their workers were
not willing to make the trade.  Many of these employees can piggyback
on the (usually better value) health plans of spouses’ employers, which
appears to be a key reason why many companies do not provide cover-
age for their employees.  Because employees of these other firms rarely
pay the full marginal cost of having family coverage (either directly
through higher out-of-pocket premiums or indirectly through lower
wage growth), employees who have this safety net for coverage often
prefer to be compensated in higher wages rather than in benefits.  In
firms where employers responded that their employees’ ability to get
insurance elsewhere was a very important reason for not offering insur-
ance, 73 percent of the employees did obtain health insurance from
another source (McLaughlin and Zellers 1994).
Availability
There was another reason for lack of coverage, however.  Some of
these owners would have been interested in providing group coverage
but expressed difficulty obtaining insurance because of insurance
underwriting procedures.  For one out of five small businesses without
insurance, the lack of insurance can be attributed to redlining and pre-
existing condition exclusions (redlining is the exclusion of specific
types of businesses from eligibility for coverage).  Insurers may desig-
nate a business unacceptable if they consider employees of these busi-
nesses to be at a higher risk for illness or injury because of occupation,
age, lifestyles, etc. 
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Virtually all insurers of small businesses engage in a practice
known as redlining, drawing a red line across the list of risks, making
all industries with risks above that amount ineligible for insurance
(Zellers et al. 1992).  McLaughlin and Zellers also surveyed insurance
companies and independent agents in the same seven cities participat-
ing in the employer survey, as well as the 10 national companies with
the largest book of business in the small group market.  They asked for
examples of industries that are routinely redlined and received under-
writing brochures from 20 different companies. 
Eighty-five percent of insurance agents and 48 percent of insurance
company representatives said they redline specific types of busi-
nesses.  Seven percent of all small business employees whose compa-
nies do not offer insurance are excluded because of redlining practices.
As shown in Figure 2, redlined industries are not just those industries
such as asbestos removal firms and mining and logging companies that
have hazardous working conditions.  Major employers such as restau-
rants, bars, hair salons, physician offices, and law offices are also com-
monly redlined.  About 15 percent of small firms are in industries that
are routinely redlined (Zellers et al. 1992).
Figure 2 Types of Redlined Businesses
SOURCE: McLaughlin and Zellers (1994).
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Employees in redlined industries are considered “undesirable” not
only because of working conditions but because of the age, other
demographic characteristics, or lifestyles of employees.  Redlined
industries typically employ older workers (over age 55) and/or have
high employee turnover, seasonal workforces, or workforces paid by
commission or on the basis of other contractual terms.  The hair salon
industry is particularly illustrative of the problem faced by many of the
employees of these businesses.   As one insurer stated, these employees
are seen by insurers as representing a “triple threat: lots of turnover,
young women who get pregnant, and gays with the threat of AIDS.”
Physicians are seen as “heavy utilizers, hypochondriacs,” and lawyers
as “too litigious, they dispute every claim denied.” 3
While some of these individuals have the financial resources nec-
essary to purchase insurance in the individual market or can obtain
group insurance through professional organizations, this is not the case
for some workers, such as hair stylists or professional musicians in
local symphonies.  These individuals decided, most likely in high
school, to acquire the human capital necessary to become a profes-
sional in this field, not knowing that down the road, when they were no
longer “young invincibles” but 30-year-old pregnant women or 40-
year-olds with carpal tunnel syndrome or hypertension, they would
have problems getting coverage because of their profession.  At this
point, they either have to change careers, learning new skills market-
able to industries that are not redlined, seek individual coverage with a
very high premium, or remain without financial protection for any
medical care needs.  Now, one policy response could be, “Well, you
chose this career; you earned a return to that investment, and now you
have to face the consequences of that choice.”  And, as long as that
individual had full information about potential problems in the future,
an argument can be made that this is an efficient path.  In any case,
once an individual has acquired specific skills, it is often difficult to
move freely in the labor market.  Those earlier choices lead to con-
straints.
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VARIATION IN INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION RATES
Eligibility
Seventy-five percent of workers are employed by firms that do
offer insurance (McLaughlin 1999a).  Not all workers are eligible,
however; approximately 5 percent of workers are not eligible for their
firm’s plan.  
The most common reasons for being ineligible have to do with the
employment contract, particularly working part time (Table 1).  Analy-
sis of the 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) data shows that while
80 percent of full-time workers are offered insurance, only 19 percent
of those working fewer than 20 hours a week are.  Even this difference
is mitigated by the size of firm, with more part-time workers offered
health insurance by larger firms.  In firms with 100 or more workers,
the percentage of at least half-time workers offered health insurance is
virtually the same as that of full-time workers.  A worker’s salary also
influences whether or not she or he will be offered health insurance.
Higher-paid workers are much more likely to be offered health insur-
ance.  Forty-three percent of workers earning less than $7 per hour are
offered health insurance by their employers, whereas 93 percent of
those earning more than $15 per hour are offered coverage (Cooper and
Steinberg-Schone 1997).  Once again, this difference narrows as the
firm size increases (Bucci and Grant 1995).  Younger workers are also
less likely to be offered health insurance—only 51 percent of those
younger than 25 years old are offered coverage (Cooper and Steinberg-
Schone 1997).
Table 1 Reasons for Being Ineligible
• 26% are still in probationary period
• 9% are contract or temporary workers
• 58% are part-time workers
• 2% have preexisting conditions
SOURCE: 1993 Current Population Survey data reported in Yakoboski et al. (1994).
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For a small percentage of workers, medical underwriting practices,
specifically preexisting condition exclusion clauses, result in ineligibil-
ity.  Preexisting condition exclusion clauses deny coverage to individu-
als for conditions for which they have received medical care in the past.
With very small groups (fewer than 10 employees), it is not uncommon
for an insurer to deny coverage to the entire business if one or more
employees has a potentially high-cost preexisting condition.  
Again, these barriers are more common in small businesses, not
because workers are more likely to have preexisting conditions, but
because insurance companies rarely check for these conditions, much
less act on them, in large firms.  Based on their survey, McLaughlin
and Zellers estimated that 15–20 percent of the employees in small
firms were ineligible for coverage, not just for the first six months of
employment or just for the condition, but for any insurance policy.  
Exclusions for preexisting conditions may be a primary reason for
“job lock.” (Cooper and Monheit 1993).  These exclusions discourage
workers from switching jobs because they or a family member may not
be covered for a health problem under a new insurance plan or may
lose coverage altogether.  Some of these conditions are chronic condi-
tions and can therefore affect career choices. 
McLaughlin and Zellers (1994) found that the most frequently
excluded conditions were heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and AIDS
(Figure 3).  Heart disease was the medical condition that was more
commonly excluded for coverage by insurance companies.  Fifty-three
of the 83 insurance company representatives and agents who were
asked about their preexisting condition exclusion policies said they
excluded coverage of heart disease for individuals who have already
been diagnosed and treated for this condition.  Other excluded condi-
tions include mental or nervous conditions, degenerative nerve disor-
ders such as muscular dystrophy and multiple sclerosis, kidney
anomalies, and stroke.  In some cases, insurers were unwilling to pro-
vide coverage for anyone in the firm if one worker had one of these
conditions.  Interestingly, insurers cited preexisting conditions or
“health problems” as the main reason small businesses have difficulty
obtaining health coverage.  
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Employee Choice
Some workers who are eligible for coverage choose to “just say
no.”  A recent study comparing household surveys from 1989 and 1996
reveals that a greater number of  workers, particularly low-wage work-
ers, are declining to take employer-sponsored insurance (Cooper and
Steinberg-Schone 1997).  The turn-down rate is higher among low-
wage workers.  A reasonable interpretation of these data is that these
workers are not willing to pay the out-of-pocket premiums and hope to
trade at least some wage growth for health insurance.  In the 1996
national survey, 80 percent of workers who were offered a plan chose
to participate.  In contrast, only 63 percent of workers earning less than
$7 per hour chose to participate.  Less than 50 percent of those working
part time chose to participate, in addition to 70 percent of those under
age 25 and 74 percent of those working in firms with fewer than 25
employees (Cooper and Steinberg-Schone 1997).
In addition, as noted in Table 2, some workers choose not to partic-
ipate because they have insurance through another source.  Of those
Figure 3 Medical Conditions Frequently Excluded
SOURCE: McLaughlin and Zellers (1994).
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who decline, 75 percent have other group coverage, usually through a
spouse’s plan (Yakoboski et al. 1994).  Analysis of the 1993 CPS data
revealed that women were more likely to choose not to participate
(Yakoboski et al. 1994).  Buchmueller (1996) found that men who
work full time are more likely to receive employer-sponsored health
insurance than are women who work full time.  According to his analy-
sis, this gap is driven largely by the tendency of married women to
decline employer-sponsored insurance in favor of being covered
through their husband’s employer’s insurance policy.  
The availability of another source of insurance enables many work-
ers to choose employment in the small business community, to say no
to costly or undesirable plans, to elect to stay home and engage in
child-rearing, or to obtain further training and education.  It is also,
however, the source of inequities.  Employers rarely charge employees,
either directly or indirectly, the full marginal cost of choosing a family
plan rather than a single plan.  Therefore, single workers (or married
workers with a spouse covered by employment-based insurance who
elect single coverage) subsidize workers who choose family coverage
at reduced prices.  While society may decide that this subsidy is an effi-
cient way to enable parents to stay home or spouses to remain in
school, problems of horizontal inequity arise between similar workers
of large firms and small firms.  
Not all workers who decline coverage or work for a firm without
coverage have insurance through another source; a significant number
of them are uninsured.  In fact, 85 percent of the uninsured are workers
and their dependents (McLaughlin 1999a).  The number of medically
uninsured adults and children is steadily increasing and is the cause of
many policy recommendations, at both the federal and state level.
Table 2 Reasons for Choosing not to Participate
• 75% have other source of coverage
• 23% say plan is too costly
• 2% say plan has too many limitations
• 6% say they don’t need or want coverage
SOURCE: 1993 Current Population Survey data reported in Yakoboski et al. (1994).
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While some people are uninsured because of underwriting condi-
tions, most are not.  Many  workers are eligible for coverage yet
decline; others work in firms that do not offer coverage.  These two
groups of workers are very similar in measured characteristics: young,
lower wage, and single (Long and Marquis 1993; Cooper and Stein-
berg-Schone 1997).
In some cases, these uninsured workers feel that they do not need
coverage.  They are basing this decision on their known health status
and past experience.  Unfortunately, if one of these workers is in a car
accident, or develops cancer or diabetes, we do not say, “Too bad, you
made your choice and chose not to trade wages for health insurance.
Now we choose not to provide care for you.”  In part, we recognize that
there is poor information about future needs, about the probability of
an exogenous shock to our health status, and we decide to provide care
for them that is then subsidized by those who chose to make the trade.  
Chernew et al. (1997) estimated the subsidy amount necessary to
prompt voluntary participation in health insurance.  They estimated
that for a significant number of workers, the subsidy would have to be
almost as large as the premium; therefore, the welfare loss of mandat-
ing that they trade wages for health insurance would be quite high.
There is a high price to taking away people’s choice.
CHOICE OF PLANS
Finally, we get to those workers who choose to participate; they
remain the majority of working adults.  Half of these workers have no
choice in plan, and most of them are offered only a traditional fee-for-
service plan.  Half of those with choice are offered only one or more
traditional plans; about one-third are offered only one or more man-
aged care plans.  For many workers, the choice of employer determines
the choice of plan.  Although the percentage of firms offering more
than one health care plan is increasing, it is still the case that the major-
ity of all firms offer only one plan (McLaughlin 1999a).
As shown in Table 3, just as being offered any plan varies by firm
size, so does the availability of choice of plan types.  The percentage of
firms offering more than one plan increases with firm size—as low as
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10 percent of firms with fewer than 100 employees and rising to 90
percent of firms with 5,000 or more employees (McLaughlin 1999a).
A 1996 KPMG survey found that only 9 percent of employees of firms
with fewer than 10 employees were offered a choice of plans, whereas
54 percent of employees of firms with more than 200 employees were
offered choice (Gabel, Ginsburg, and Hunt 1997). 
Of those firms that offer a choice, the majority offer a choice
between two plans (Bucci and Grant 1995).   About one-fifth offer a
choice between three plans, and a few offer more than three plans from
which to choose.  About one-half of all workers with choice are offered
two plans, one-fifth are offered three plans, and the rest are offered four
or more.  Again, the tendency to offer multiple plans increases with
firm size.  A 1997 Mercer survey estimated that 56 percent of compa-
nies with 3,000 or more employees offer three or four plan types (Mer-
cer’s Fax Facts 1997).  
It turns out that for many of us, the choice of health insurance is an
important one.  Once enrolled in a particular plan, consumers are con-
strained by the specifics of the plan.  The decisions about when to seek
care and which provider to use are influenced by the type and financial
Table 3 Combinations of Plan Types Offered by Employers, by Firm Size
% of firms 
that offer












FFS only 74 44 62 32
HMO only 8 8 11 6
PPO only 12 18 14 15
FFS + HMO 3 17 7 22
FFS + PPO 1 2 1 2
HMO + PPO 2 9 3 14
FFS + HMO + PPO <0.5 3 1 9
SOURCE: Bucci and Grant (1995); BLS data for 1992–1993.
a FFS = fee-for-service; HMO = health maintenance organization; PPO = preferred-
provider organization.
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incentives of the plan.  The choice of treatment is also constrained by
plan specifics.   A person who is a risk-taker and who would want every
possible treatment known, whether experimental or well-established, if
faced with a life-threatening disease, would want a different kind of
plan than a person who is more conservative in treatment choice.  An
employer can use health insurance options to influence the kind of
worker seeking employment in that firm.  For example, offering a sub-
sidized family coverage benefit may discourage single workers and
encourage young workers with families.  A firm whose work requires
risk-taking may want to offer a high-deductible plan. 
LIMITATIONS TO CHOICE
One of the basic principles of managed care is reduced choice, par-
ticularly reduced choice of provider.  In general, healthier individuals,
those who anticipate needing very little interaction with the medical
care sector, are going to be less sensitive to this reduced choice.  The
resulting enrollment of healthier workers, combined with a host of
financial incentives and structural aspects, has led to lower premiums.
These lower premiums, coupled with low co-pays, particularly for
pharmaceuticals, have encouraged consumers to overcome their aver-
sion to reduced choice and elect to enroll in managed care plans when
given a choice.
Much of the unhappiness with the managed care market results
from lack of information.  When surveyed, most enrollees focus on the
reduced premia and co-pays and express ignorance about limited
choice (Mechanic et al. 1990).  When they then get sick and become
acutely aware of the limitations, they are unpleasantly surprised and
angry (McLaughlin 1999b).  Of course, the response can be, “Well,
you chose lower costs over limited choice.  Now you must live with the
consequences.”  Again, this is assuming that they were fully informed
about the consequences of their choice, that they were able to read and
understand the fine print in their insurance contract.  If workers receive
more information, some may choose the traditional plan instead.  For
the one-third of workers who had no choice other than managed care,
the only option is to seek employment in another firm.  
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In some important ways, the individual who chooses to self-insure
faces the least constraints; he or she is free to choose any willing pro-
vider.  Of course, lack of money greatly reduces this freedom for many.
In fact, one could say that for most people, the major constraint to
choice is money.
At this point, it is clear that these decisions at the endpoint work
back through the other decisions.  The perceived need for freedom of
choice of provider and treatment may reflect knowledge of medical
need, which in turn influences the desire to enter the workforce to
begin with.  The decision process is certainly not a nice, neat linear
model of consumer choice.  Rather, it is more like the highways around
Los Angeles, looping under and over, with complex figure eights, and
equally congested and frustrating to the analyst.  Unfortunately, private
and public policymakers considering policies that address issues of
health insurance choice must look at all the various pieces, recognizing
that a change in the relative prices or options faced at one dyad will
affect other choices.  Only when researchers provide better estimates of
the likely size of these so-called unintended consequences will policy-
makers be able to develop policies that yield the desired effects.
Notes
1. See, for example, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24:5.  Special Issue:
The Managed Care Backlash, Mark A. Peterson (ed.), 1999.
2. From author interviews.
3. From author interviews.
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